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The Moral Addressor Account of Moral Agency 
Abstract 
According to the practice-focused approach to moral agency, a 
participant stance towards an entity is warranted by the extent 
to which this entity qualifies as an apt target of ascriptions of 
moral responsibility, such as blame. Entities who are not eligible 
for such reactions are exempted from moral responsibility 
practices, and thus denied moral agency. I claim that many 
typically exempted cases may qualify as moral agents by being 
eligible for a distinct participant stance. When we participate in 
moral responsibility practices, we are not only participating as 
potential targets of moral reactions, but also as sources of such 
address, i.e. as moral addressors. By consequence, there are 
entities towards which we seem to have reason to adopt 
an addressor participant stance, regardless of their eligibility as 
moral addressees. This expanded theoretical room for moral 
agency may also be of normative import. 
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Young children, people with certain cognitive disabilities and 
conditions, nonhuman animals, and machines are typically 
denied moral agency. This denial is based on assumptions about 
what it means to be a moral agent. One such assumption is that 
the notion of moral agency designates entities who, in a general 
sense, qualify for ascriptions of moral responsibility (Talbert, 
2019). Because young children, nonhuman animals, and many 
other entities, are taken to lack the capacities necessary for 
being morally responsible, they are denied moral agency (c.f. 
Tognazzini & Coates, 2018; Hew, 2014; Johnson, 2006; 
Parthemore & Whitby, 2013; Korsgaard, 2006, 2010; Ayala, 
2010; Rowlands, 2012; Musschenga, 2015). A similar 
assumption can be found in the practice-focused approach to 
moral agency, which links this agency to a so-called participant 
stance toward the entity under consideration. A participant 
stance towards an entity is warranted by the extent to which 
this entity qualifies as a participant in a moral responsibility 
practice, and the usual way to deny it is to claim that this entity 
is not an apt recipient or target of ascriptions of moral 
responsibility, such as blame. Entities who are not eligible for 
such reactions are exempted from moral responsibility 
practices, and thus denied moral agency.  
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While this article adopts a practice-focused approach, I argue 
that this approach has so far construed participation in moral 
responsibility practices in an overly one-sided way, as it has 
overlooked important aspects of such participation. When we 
participate in these practices, we are not only participating as 
potential targets of moral address, but also as sources of such 
address, i.e. as moral addressors. Accordingly, even if an entity is 
not seen as a suitable target, or addressee, it may still be a moral 
addressor. In this paper, I will argue that being a moral 
addressor may ground a distinct form of participation in moral 
responsibility practices. In effect, an entity can be an addressor 
participant of moral responsibility practices, even if that entity 
fails to meet requirements for being an addressee participant. 
Such entities warrant the taking of an addressor participant 
stance toward them. This expanded theoretical room for moral 
agency may also serve to illuminate further, normative, reasons 
against exempting someone as a moral addressor.  
 
My thesis in this paper is that being a moral addressor grounds 
one form of participation in moral responsibility practices. 
Entities who are exempted as moral addressees, may thus still 
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be considered moral agents in virtue of warranting the taking of 
an addressor participant stance toward them. 
 
The basic structure of this thesis runs as follows: 
i. An entity is a participant of moral responsibility 
practices if it warrants the taking of a participant stance 
toward that entity. 
ii. Participation in moral responsibility practices involves, 
among other things, to participate as a moral addressor. 
iii. Some typically exempted entities participate in moral 
responsibility practices as moral addressors . 
iv. Some typically exempted entities therefore warrant the 
taking of an addressor participant stance toward them. 
 
In the next section (2) I account for the practice-focused 
approach to moral agency, in which a moral agent is defined as 
a participant of moral responsibility practices. Later, I situate 
this approach within a communicative framework, where such 
participation is specified as engagement between a moral 
addressor and a moral addressee, within a “moral exchange”. 
After this (section 3), I provide two examples of interactions 
involving entities who are typically denied moral agency: young 
children and dogs. I argue that, despite their disputed eligibility 
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as moral addressees, some common reactions of these entities 
seem to fit a communicative conception of participation as 
moral addressors in moral responsibility practices. The 
participant stance should therefore be conceived of as involving 
two distinct stances: one that tracks eligibility for being a moral 
addressee, and one that tracks eligibility for being a moral 
addressor. I support these claims by turning to a functional 
understanding of moral address which states that moral 
address plays a certain uptake-evoking role (section 4). I argue 
that this theory implies distinct functions for moral address and 
moral response, and in turn, distinct eligibility requirements for 
the addressee and addressor participant stances. These distinct 
requirements support the taking of an addressor participant 
stance toward some entities, despite their disputed or uncertain 
eligibility as moral addressees. In the last section (5) I conclude 
the argument and point to some further questions raised by 
these discussions.  
 
2. Background  
Philosophers, and others, have engaged in various debates 
about the boundaries of moral agency and the possibility of non-
paradigmatic moral agents. Is it possible for young children, or 
people with seemingly agency-undermining conditions or 
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disabilities to be moral agents (c.f. Wallace, 1996; Shoemaker, 
2009, 2015; Kennett, 2002)? What about nonhuman animals 
(Korsgaard, 2006, 2010; Rowlands, 2012; Musschenga, 2015; 
Anonymous, 2020; Cova, 2013)? And would it ever be possible 
for artificial entities to be the kinds of beings that can act right 
or wrong, good or bad (Johnson, 2006; Tognazzini & Coates, 
2018; Hew, 2014; Parthemore & Whitby, 2013; c.f. Anonymous, 
2020)?  
 
Despite the great variance in requirements and the entities 
considered, a common denominator for these discussions is that 
the key question is taken to be whether a certain entity qualifies 
for ascriptions of moral responsibility. Can, e.g., a young child or 
a dog ever be morally, as opposed to merely causally, 
responsible for their behavior? I believe that by assuming that 
moral agency is, first and foremost, a status or set of powers that 
makes one eligible for such ascriptions or assessments, these 
discussions have overlooked essential aspects of moral agency.  
 
These aspects can be brought out by adopting a practice-focused 
approach to moral agency, in particular in its communicative 
variety. From this approach, moral agency is understood as the 
participation in certain social practices where moral attitudes 
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and judgments of moral responsibility are held, expressed, and 
undertaken. These social practices will hereafter be called moral 
responsibility practices (or MRPs) (Anonymous, 2020).  
 
2.1 Strawson’s Two Stances 
All practice-focused approaches to moral agency and 
responsibility can be traced back to P.F. Strawson’s famous 
essay Freedom and Resentment (1962/1982). Strawson rejects 
skepticism toward moral responsibility based on an 
incompatabilist denial of free will by claiming that we are 
naturally predisposed to, and unable to refrain from, the 
emotional responses fundamental to our practices of holding 
responsible. These reactive attitudes, like gratitude and 
resentment, are responses “to the quality of others’ wills 
towards us” (1962/1982, p. 70). Our disposition to respond in 
this way toward others implies certain expectations or demands 
for “goodwill or regard” (1962/1982, p. 64).  
Central to Strawson’s account are the different perspectives we 
take on the world. The participant and objective attitudes or 
standpoints, differ with respect to the types of reactions we 
deem suitable to the actions of others. From the participant 
standpoint, we view others as apt objects of reactive attitudes. 
Taking this standpoint toward someone, therefore, means that 
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we take that person to be, in a general sense, morally 
responsible. However, taking an objective stance toward 
someone, indicates the opposite assumption, i.e. we view them 
to be an inapt target of reactive attitudes.  
Normal adult humans are paradigms of morally responsible 
agents (or moral agents) and their actions are taken to express 
their quality of will towards others. But reactive attitudes can be 
modified or appeased in light of certain excusing or exempting 
conditions (Watson, 1987/2004). We might for example, say 
“'He didn't mean to', 'He hadn't realized', 'He didn't know'; and 
(…) 'He couldn't help it', (…) 'He was pushed', 'He had to do it', 
'It was the only way', 'They, left him no alternative', etc.” 
(Strawson, 1962/1982, p. 64). These expressions reflect 
excusing conditions, and indicate that the agent’s action was not 
in fact due to ill will or lack of concern. They show that the agent 
is not an apt target of reactive attitudes for the particular injury, 
but do not provide reasons to question the agent’s general 
eligibility for reactive attitudes.  
Exempting conditions are reflected in expressions like “'He's 
only a child', 'He's a hopeless schizophrenic', 'His mind has been 
systematically perverted', 'That's purely compulsive behaviour 
on his part'. Such pleas (…) invite us to suspend our ordinary 
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reactive attitudes towards the agent, either at the time of his 
action or all the time.” (Strawson, 1962/1982, p. 65). A case like 
this, ”presents the agent as psychologically abnormal- or as 
morally undeveloped. ” (Strawson, 1962/1982, p. 66). When we 
temporarily or indefinitely suspend our ordinary reactive 
attitudes in this way, we take an objective attitude or stance. An 
entity viewed from this perspective is, accordingly, not taken to 
be “a morally responsible agent” and therefore, not “a member 
of the moral community” (Strawson, 1962/1982, p. 73). 
In this sense, the “reactive attitudes are sensitive not only to the 
quality of others' wills, but depend as well upon a background 
of beliefs about the objects of those attitudes [emphasis mine].” 
(Watson, 1987/2004, p. 80). When we adopt the objective 
stance, our ordinary practices are replaced by relating to the 
exempted entity “as an object of social policy; as a subject for 
what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as 
something certainly to be taken into account, perhaps 
precautionary account of; to be managed, handled, cured or 
trained; perhaps simply to be avoided.” (Strawson, 1962/1982, 
p. 66). Populations typically considered unsuited for reactive 
attitudes, and thus exempted in this manner, are e.g., very young 
children and adults with certain cognitive conditions or 
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disabilities. But also nonhuman entities, like other animals and 
machines (c.f. Talbert, 2019).  
From a practice-focused approach, moral agency just is the 
participation in MRPs. And our ability and inclination to switch 
between the two stances is thought to reveal the eligibility 
requirements for moral agency. Whichever stance we take 
depends on “whether the agent is an appropriate “object of that 
kind of demand for goodwill or regard which is reflected in 
ordinary reactive attitudes” (p.  65). If so, he or she is seen as a 
responsible agent, as a potential term in moral relationships, as 
a member (albeit, perhaps, in less than good standing) of the 
moral community.” (Watson, 1987/2004, pp. 225-6). 
It is, then, the (un)suitability of being the target of “moral 
demands”, expressed via reactive attitudes, which the 
participant or objective stances are thought to indicate. This 
sets the practice-focused approach to moral agency on par with 
more standard, capacity-focused, approaches. Moral agency, or 
participation in MRPs, is defined in terms of eligibility for 
ascriptions of moral responsibility. To be a moral agent is to be 
a suitable target or recipient of moral reactions and attitudes, 
such as blame.  
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2.2 A Communicative Approach  
Shoemaker suggests that the “unease” typically felt in the face of 
non-paradigmatic or “marginal cases” of moral agents is due to 
the fact that “these agents seem worthy of some responsibility 
responses but not others, which suggests that they are 
responsible in some ways but not in others” (Shoemaker, 2015, 
p. 3).  I believe that an overlooked but important additional 
cause of such unease, or ambivalence, is due to an overly 
restricted conception of moral participation. Defining moral 
agency in terms of being a suitable target or recipient of moral 
responsibility reactions or ascriptions appears to omit an 
essential aspect of such agency – namely, that of being the 
source or maker of such reactions or ascriptions. I will argue 
that by turning to this aspect of participation in MRPs, we find 
that many typically exempted or disputed cases, in fact, may 
qualify as moral agents in virtue of being moral addressor 
participants. Thus, exempting someone because they are 
deemed an unsuited recipient or target of, e.g., blame, does not 
necessarily give us reason to deny them moral agency 
altogether.  
A further elaboration of the practice-focused approach will help 
clarify my point. According to this view, the requirements for 
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moral agency are proposed to be explicable by appeal to “moral 
address” (Watson, 1987/2004). Participation in MRPs, 
“requires the possibility of moral address, the capacity to be 
seen as a potential interlocutor in our interpersonal exchanges” 
(McKenna, 1998, p. 127; Watson, 1987/2004; Stern, 1974).1 
Strawson’s two stances are thus argued to be tracking the 
conditions necessary for moral address. The basis for this idea 
is the claim that (some of) our MRPs are expressive or 
communicative in nature (Watson 1987/2004; Wallace, 1994; 
McKenna, 2012; Macnamara, 2015; Shoemaker, 2007, 2015; 
Darwall, 2006; Fricker, 2016; Mason, 2019). To take the 
participant stance toward someone would therefore make 
“sense only on the assumption that the other can comprehend 
the message.” (Watson, 1987/2004, p. 230).  
Participation in MRPs can thus be characterized as engaging in 
a certain type of communicative exchange, a so-called “moral 
responsibility exchange” (McKenna, 2012), or “reactive 
exchange” (McGeer, 2012, 2013). Such an exchange is, among 
other things, initiated on the assumption that the other party is 
 
1 Watson (1987/2004) introduced the term “moral address” following 
Stern’s (1974) assumption that when blaming another “we engage in 
dialogue” (p. 79). Also see McKenna (1998) for a discussion about Watson’s 
”appeal to the notion of moral address” in relation to Strawson’s theory (p. 
126). 
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someone with whom it would be possible to engage in this 
particular type of interaction.  
A moral exchange has the following generic form:2  
1. First, there is a perceived transgression or injury.  
2. This is followed by moral address toward the perceived 
transgressor by the affected or observing party. Such 
address may involve resentment, indignation, etc., and 
can be verbally expressed, e.g. in speech acts, but also 
through non-verbal means, like posture, facial 
expressions, and change in affiliation and/or distance.  
3. The initial address is then typically followed by a moral 
response from the addressed party. Such response may 
involve guilt or remorse, asking for forgiveness, 
reparations, etc. (c.f. Warmke & McKenna, 2013; Mason, 
2019) But it may also involve explanations, excuses, 
and/or even justifications. 
4. The affected or observing party may then, e.g., forgive, let 
go, overcome, or maintain their initial attitude (c.f. 
Milam, 2019).  
 
2 For simplicity's sake, I will focus on blaming reactions/ascriptions of 
negative responsibility. 
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The following scenario illustrates a common type of moral 
exchange: 
FOOD STAND 
A person is standing in line to get lunch from a food stand. The 
area is crowded and noisy. Suddenly, someone forcefully steps on 
her foot while attempting to pass through the line. Irritated and 
in pain, the victim shouts “ouch” while directing an annoyed look 
at the perceived transgressor. He hears her, turns around with a 
surprised expression, and proceeds by shrugging his shoulders, 
lowering his head, gritting his teeth, and lifting his hand with the 
palm exposed. In response, the victim’s face relaxes and she turns 
her head back toward the food stand.  
When we look at moral agency as the participation in certain 
communicative inter-relational practices it becomes obvious 
that an essential part of such agency is overlooked if reduced to 
questions about eligibility for being a moral addressee. A 
communicative exchange implies two parties, and thus two 
communicative positions. Shifting our gaze like this, allows us to 
see that moral agency, defined in terms of MRP participation, 
also involves the moral addressing of others. Acknowledging 
this addressor role gives us reason to consider eligibility 
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requirements for the addressing party in a moral exchange. 
What does it take to participate as a moral addressor?  
 
3. Participating as a Moral Addressor 
What is required for participating as a moral addressor in 
MRPs? And what are the implications of these requirements? 
Recent years have seen a growing interest in questions 
regarding facts about the addressing party. The idea here is that 
not everyone is, as one might say: “blamer-worthy” (Friedman, 
2013, p. 272). For example, someone who is otherwise a moral 
addressor may, in some situations, lack the “jurisdiction”, 
“authorization” or “status” required to blame (c.f. Friedman, 
2013; McGeer & Pettit, 2015; Tognazzini & Coates, 2018). In 
recent years, a few authors have also stressed the issue of 
unwarranted exemptions of moral addressor participants. For 
example, Carbonell (2019) argues that “[s]ocial factors can 
systematically exclude some moral agents from engaging in the 
kind of interpersonal address necessary for holding others 
responsible…” (p. 169; c.f. Mackenzie, 2018; Hutchison, 2018; 
Fricker, 2007).  
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However, these discussions primarily concern particular 
instances, in light of certain facts about the blaming party and/or 
situation, not the question whether someone is generally 
eligible as a moral addressor. The latter is a more fundamental 
and distinct issue, in a similar way to how we distinguish 
between questions about general eligibility for ascriptions of 
moral responsibility and particular blameworthiness. If being 
the source of moral address is a form of participation in MRPs, a 
practice-focused approach requires us to pay attention to the 
question of moral addressor eligibility when settling the issue 
whether an entity is a participant or not. Specifying moral 
addressor eligibility therefore has implications both for the 
theoretical scope of possible moral agents, as well as for our 
everyday practices.  
Let us consider some examples involving entities with whom 
most of us interact from time to time, but who we typically 
disregard as moral agents in the addressee sense. In both cases, 
I use blaming as a placeholder for moral address: 
NOUR 
A four-year-old, Nour, is watching her parent bake a cake. She 
asks if she can lick the frosting off the beaters, and her parent 
promises to hand them over to her as soon as she is done mixing. 
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After finishing the cake, the parent, out of sheer habit, rinses the 
beaters in the sink. Nour sees this, and in response, her facial 
expression undergoes a familiar transformation. Her calm 
composure is replaced by a pouting mouth, furrowed brows, 
followed by angry cries at her parent.  
 
MOLLY 
A dog, Molly, is resting on the couch. A (human) friend is visiting 
and approaches to greet Molly. Molly really likes being stroked, 
but she does not like all kinds of physical contact. In particular, 
she despises being hugged. Upon realizing that the visitor is 
approaching her with his arm stretched out, Molly turns her head 
away and licks her snout. When he comes closer, her ears get 
pinned back and she shifts her weight away from him. But the 
visitor proceeds to hug Molly anyway. In response, Molly starts to 
growl. When the human does not stop hugging her, Molly nips him, 
and when he does not respond to this either, Molly finally retorts 
to biting him.  
While a young child or a dog would typically not be regarded as 
suitable targets or recipients of many (or even most) ascriptions 
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of moral responsibility,3 they might still be moral agents in 
virtue of qualifying as moral addressors. Both Nour’s and 
Molly’s reactions appear to fit the conception of moral address 
as involving a certain expressive or communicative element. 
Nour seems to react to a perceived broken promise, and Molly 
to a perceived breach of physical boundaries.  
In effect, the participant stance should be viewed as involving 
(at least) two distinct sub-stances; an addressee stance and an 
addressor stance. When we take the first stance towards 
someone, we view and treat them as being eligible for blame and 
similar reactive attitudes and ascriptions. When we take the 
second stance, we view and treat others as the kind of entities 
that can morally address us and others. In effect, we may have 
reasons to take an addressor participant stance towards (some) 
entities that we typically exempt as moral addressees.4  
How can we determine if an entity is a moral addressor or not? 
Surely, not every reaction or expression qualifies as moral 
 
3 Note, that I am not denying this possibility, but merely stating that my 
argument does not bear upon this question. 
4 Another question that arises is whether some entities should be exempted 
as moral addressors while being recognized as moral addressees (i.e. the 
converse possibility to what I argue for). This possibility has been 
challenged by Russell (2004) and McKenna (2012), and defended by Haji 
(2003). 
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address? For example, consider a case where a person's 
headphones suddenly emit a very loud screeching noise. It is 
understandable for that person to (even aggressively) claw the 
headphones off their head. Most of us would probably also be 
understanding if the clawing was accompanied by some foul 
language. Even foul language seemingly directed at the 
headphones. But we would not take that to indicate that the 
person was expressing moral resentment toward the 
headphones.5  
Similarly, if a dog or a young child expresses anger or frustration 
at something or someone, this may not be sufficient in order for 
us to conclude that they are morally addressing. Anger, 
frustration, and other emotions may dispose us to behave and 
interact in various ways toward objects. However, anger or 
frustration is not equivalent to agential, or moral, attitudes, such 
as resentment or indignation.6 In the next section, I will suggest 
requirements for addressor eligibility on the basis of a 
 
5 Similarly, Mason (2019) claims that ”[w]e can feel anger, annoyance, and 
irritation at all sorts of things, though, arguably, the way in which one is 
angry with a non-agent is different to the way in which one is angry with an 
agent. ” (p. 119).  
 
6 Shoemaker (2015) expresses this point when claiming that “some 
creatures, such as babies and bears, clearly get angry too…”  but that their 
anger “…is not plausibly construed as a responsibility response. Here the 
object of the anger in all such cases may merely be goal-frustration.” (p. 90; 
c.f. Shoemaker, 2018). 
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functional theory of moral address. By characterizing these 
practices in terms of their functional role, I infer fittingness 
conditions for a distinct addressor participant stance. This 
functional understanding of MRPs thereby supports my main 
thesis that some entities typically exempted from MRP 
participation qualify as addressor participants, and warrant an 
addressor participant stance. 
 
4. Moral Addressor Eligibility 
According to a widely embraced theory, moral reactions can be 
distinguished from other kinds of reactions by their function. 
This functional account holds that moral address, such as blame, 
plays a regulative, transformative, calibrating, or fostering role 
(c.f. Vargas, 2013; Björnsson & Persson, 2012; 2013; Dill & 
Darwall, 2014; Fricker, 2016; Talbert, 2012; McKenna, 2012, 
2013; Macnamara, 2011, 2015; Wallace, 2019; Bennett, 2012; 
Tsai, 2017, Mason, 2019; and Duff, 1986).7  
 
 
7 Note that accounts like these, need not, and usually do not, imply the 
alleged function of blaming practices to play a significant (or any) part in 
the proximate motivations, responses, and judgments of moral participants 
(c.f. McGeer, 2013; Macnamara, 2015; Björnsson & Persson, 2013).  
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This functional theory goes well with the mentioned conception 
of moral address as paradigmatically expressed in other-
directed communication. After all, “[m]any paradigmatic 
messages” have “the function of evoking uptake” (Macnamara, 
2015, p. 564), and reactive attitudes and other forms of moral 
address are typically conceived of as “urging”, “requiring”, 
“demanding”, “inviting”, “call for” etc., a response in the recipient 
or target.8  
 
Applying this functional account to MRPs helps us to distinguish 
moral address from other types of reactions to actions and 
events. In addition, understanding moral address in functional 
terms implies certain eligibility requirements for being a moral 
addressee. This is important for the case I am making. I argue 
that an entity may warrant a distinct participant stance as a 
moral addressor, regardless of its eligibility as a moral 
addressee. I support this claim by arguing that moral reactions 
and moral responses have distinct functional aims. 
Consequently, the position or role of addressor and addressee 
imply distinct eligibility requirements. 
 
8 See footnote 11 in Macnamara (2015) for a very helpful overview of the 
so-called “response claim”. 
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In order to support the claim about the distinct function of 
moral response, we need to turn to the first step of a moral 
exchange, i.e., the initial reaction of moral address to a perceived 
transgression or harm (section 2.2). By applying a functional 
understanding of moral address, we can distinguish moral 
address from other reactions and infer eligibility requirements 
for whom to view as a moral addressee. I will utilize the same 
functional framework in order to infer the functional role of 
moral response, and its implications for moral addressor 
eligibility. 
 
4.1 The Function of Moral Address 
What is required for a reaction to count as moral address? And 
what does this imply for moral addressee eligibility? According 
to the functional account, the answer to these questions lies in 
the role and aim of moral reactions. Shoemaker (2015; 2018) 
suggests that “agential anger” or “blaming anger” can be 
distinguished from other types of anger by being characterized 
as a certain “sentimental syndrome”. This syndrome, he argues, 
consists of the following correlated signs and symptoms: 1. 
“feelings of heat and aggression”, 2. “thoughts about slights”, 
and 3. “action tendencies to revenge or retribution 
(communicated as such)” (Shoemaker, 2015, p. 90).  
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In a similar way, Macnamara (2015) argues that reactive 
attitudes differ from other emotions in virtue of having a certain 
representational content. When we feel resentment, for 
instance, we have an intentional state that represents someone 
as having wronged us in some way: “My resentment of you for 
betraying my confidences represents you as having injured or 
offended me.” (Macnamara, 2015, p. 557). Because reactive 
attitudes are associated with certain facial signatures and other 
expressive behaviors, they communicate that representational 
content to the receiver.9  
 
Drawing on these accounts, we can characterize moral address 
(like blaming) as an emotion (e.g., resentment) comprising of, or 
associated with: a certain feeling or phenomenal state, a specific 
content and/or directedness,10 linked to certain “action 
 
9 Also see Tangney et al., (2007) for a review on moral emotions, like 
”righteous anger”, and Haidt (2003) for a review about ”other-condemning” 
emotions (like anger, contempt, and disgust), and their suggested elicitors 
and actions tendencies.  
10 There are of course many differing views and theories about emotions 
and their content. For example, there is disagreement about the 
components of emotions or emotion episodes and their correlations, as well 
as disagreement about what type of content (if any) emotions have (c.f. 
Prinz, 2004; Scarantino, 2016; Boghossian, 1995; Scarantino & de Sousa, 
2021; Shargel & prinz, 2018). Despite this, there is broad consensus that 
“[e]motion episodes involve, at least in prototypical cases, a set of 
evaluative, physiological, phenomenological, expressive, behavioral, and 
mental components that are diagnostic of emotions and are to some degree 
correlated with one another”, and that ”[e]motions have intentionality or 
the ability to represent” (Scarantino & de Sousa, 2021, section 11- point 3).  
 24 
tendencies”. The addressee participant stance, then, just is the 
stance from which a moral addressor is disposed to react 
toward perceived transgressions with certain emotions 
associated with certain expressive behaviors. A function of this 
moral address is to evoke uptake of its content in terms of the 
right sort of responses (with the aim of re-calibration, 
adjustment or reform). The general suitability of the addressee 
participant stance, therefore, depends on whether uptake of this 
latter kind is possible (and probable). 
Based on this, Nour’s and Molly’s reactions seem to qualify as 
moral address. Four-year-old children, dogs, and many other 
typically exempted entities, obviously, feel and express 
emotions, some of which involve “heat and aggression”. 
Similarly, seeing that these emotions are elicited upon apparent 
transgressions, their expression seems to imply certain types of 
contents, like representations of having been “injured or 
offended” (Macnamara, 2015, p.557), and/or certain 
evaluations, like taking an action and/or agent to be 
“angersome” (Shoemaker, 2018, p. 76), and/or certain types of 
non-representational contents, like presenting an agent and/or 
her action as something to “distance oneself from” (Bennett, 
2012, p. 76; c.f. Shargel & Prinz, 2018). 
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When Nour sees her parent wash the beaters clean, and thinks 
she broke her promise, her anger can e.g. be said to represent 
her parent as having wronged her.11 Similarly, when Molly is 
hugged against her expressed will, she probably feels violated. 
Her anger can, e.g., be said to represent the guest as displaying 
ill will.12 Furthermore, the moral address of many entities 
typically exempted as moral addressees is associated with 
certain expressions and action tendencies, such as facial 
expressions, vocalizations, and other behaviors which, in a 
similar sense to those of typical adult humans, appear to be 
functionally aimed at evoking uptake of their content. 
 
4.2 Moral Addressee Eligibility 
So, what function counts as the right type of uptake to warrant 
an addressee participant stance? One type of functional 
understanding of MRPs can be found in Smart’s (1961) moral 
influence account. According to this theory, an entity is taken to 
be eligible as a moral addressee by being “an agent who can be 
 
11 Young children appear to expect, recognize and engage in reconciliatory 
strategies (c.f. Westlund et al., 2008; Fujisawa et al., 2005; Butovskaya et al., 
2000). 
12 Many nonhuman animals are adapted and socialized to recognize and 
engage in various types of normative exchanges, like reconciliatory 
behaviors (Baan et al., 2014; Cordoni & Palagi, 2008; Cools et al., 2007; c.f. 
Aureli et al., 2002). Dogs have also been shown to make use of such 
behaviors also in dog-human dyads (Cavalli et al., 2016). 
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influenced by praise and blame” (Jefferson, 2019, p. 556; 
Arneson, 2003). But merely requiring “compliance with moral 
demands without concern for the inner states of the creature” 
has been criticized for setting the bar too low (Jefferson, 2019, 
p. 558).13 All organisms, as well as many artificial entities, adjust 
or recalibrate their behavior in response to certain input. If the 
target mechanism is not specified further, mere influenceability 
to blame and praise seems to undermine the distinction 
between moral reactions and responses, and other interactions, 
like coercion, dressage, or manipulation.14  
A development of the original moral influence account, 
however, defines the functional role of moral address in a way 
that maintains the relevance of moral attitudes, concepts, and 
practices. According to this notion, moral address attains its 
functional goal, by eliciting a more specific, qualified type of 
uptake in the recipient. This qualified uptake has been defined 
in slightly different ways. For example, that the addressee is 
brought to understand the underlying moral reasons of the 
address and responds “constructively on the basis of such 
reasons” (Wallace, 1996, p. 175), and/or by internalizing moral 
 
13 See Jefferson (2019) for a discussion about criticism against Smart’s 
(1961) moral influence account.  
14 In other words, the objective stance would seem to suffice to account for 
our (seemingly) moral, reactions and responses.   
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norms (Vargas, 2013) or the alleged wrongness (Dill & Darwall, 
2014), and/or by being sensitized to new moral considerations 
(McGeer, 2012; 2015), and/or by being brought “…to remorse 
for what they have done, so that they come to be appropriately 
moved by new, shared reasons…” (Fricker, 2016, p. 176), 
and/or by eliciting “contrition and reform on the part of the 
blamed” (Talbert, 2012, p. 108), and/or by being made “to 
recognize his guilt and repent what he has done” (Duff ,1986, p. 
70).  
 
The common idea here, is that addressee eligibility requires the 
capacity to respond in the right way to moral address. The 
general suitability of the addressee participant stance depends 
on whether the perceived transgressor has the capacity to 
recognize the message of a moral reaction, and be subsequently 
inclined to adjust or re-calibrate her behavior.15 When such an 
entity is morally addressed, her motivational mechanism is not 
merely being moved, it is being moved in response to the 
specific type of message expressed by such address (McGeer & 
Pettit, 2015; Darwall, 2006; Vargas, 2013). In other words, being 
attuned to moral reactions, recognizing their content, and being 
 
15 Of course, recognizing moral address is compatible with disputing the 
particular content expressed in such address.   
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capable and inclined to respond to that content, makes one 
eligible as a moral addressee. The suitability of directing moral 
address, like blame, towards someone, thus depends on, and 
tracks, whether the intended target is eligible in this sense.16 If 
she is, an addressee participant stance towards this entity is 
fitting and warranted. 
For example, if I tell a dog not to jump up on me, and she does 
so anyway, blame would only be fitting if she is capable of the 
specific type of uptake mentioned. Dogs, young children, and 
many other typically addressee exempted entities, are certainly 
influenceable. Dogs can be trained to refrain from jumping up 
on people. However, a dog may nevertheless be unable to meet 
the specific uptake-constraints of many particular forms and 
instances of human moral address. She might for example not 
be capable of recognizing and thus morally internalize a 
human’s demand for bodily integrity, and thus not be 
blameworthy for such transgressions. Or, she might understand 
the reaction as blame, but not be able to comprehend what state 
or object it targets. Or, she might recognize both the formal and 
 
16 For example, see Björnsson & Persson (2013), who argue that ”our 
concept of responsibility plays the role it plays because it tracks conditions 
under which it works to hold someone responsible for something.” (p. 615).  
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particular object of the moral address in question, but not be 
able to respond in a fitting manner because of other reasons. For 
example, because she cannot be sufficiently motivated or 
because she is unable to inhibit this particular behavior.17  
My claim is that failure to meet requirements for moral 
addressee eligibility, does not necessarily disqualify an entity 
from being a moral addressor. It may be the case that young 
children, dogs, and other entities typically exempted as moral 
addressees, fail to meet uptake-constraints for most (or all) 
potential instances of moral address.18 Despite this fact, Nour’s 
and Molly’s reactions appear to fit the functional conception of 
moral address as intrinsically communicative by being aimed at 
eliciting “uptake of the message by a recipient” (Macnamara, 
2015, p. 553). Molly initially communicated that she did not 
want to be hugged, and when her boundaries were 
transgressed, she morally addressed the visitor in reaction to 
 
17 See Talbert (2019) for an overview of moral responsibility conditions 
relating to control and knowledge. Also, see Björnsson & Perrson (2013) for 
a helpful discussion about “the Response Condition”.  
18 It may be the case that some entities are asymmetrical MRP participants 
in relation to typical adult humans. For example, dogs may be addressee 
participants only to a very limited extent when compared to most humans, 
but symmetrical when compared to conspecifics. And children may be 
asymmetrical moral agents compared to adults for many years to come, 
while qualifying as moral addressors from an early age. 
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that transgression. Similarly, Nour reacted to a perceived 
broken promise. We may, for example, say that Molly or Nour “is 
angry with you”, that she “feels betrayed” or “unfairly treated”. 
Or that she “is asking” or “demanding” that you respect her wish. 
Or we may believe that her reaction “calls for”, “urges”, etc. for a 
certain response. 
However, if some entities’ reactions qualify as moral address, 
why does this provide reason to take a distinct participant 
stance toward them? Moral addressor eligibility, just like moral 
addressee eligibility, implies being eligible for something. In 
order to finalize the supporting argument for the addressor 
participant stance, and its relevance for entities typically 
exempted from moral agency, I will now proceed to clarify what 
this particular eligibility consists in. I will therefore turn toward 
the next step in a moral exchange. What is the function of moral 
response? And what does this function imply with regard to 
moral addressor eligibility? 
 
4.3 Moral Addressor Eligibility 
While the general suitability of the addressee participant stance 
depends on the functional aim of moral address, I argue that the 
suitability of the addressor participant stance depends on the 
functional aim of moral response. In order to determine moral 
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addressor eligibility, we therefore need to move beyond the 
moral address step of a moral exchange, and acknowledge the 
distinct function or role of moral response.  
  
Let us re-cap: a moral exchange is initiated upon a perceived 
transgression, followed by moral address in reaction to that 
transgression. The functional aim of moral address is to evoke 
uptake of the content of, say, a blaming reaction. So, the 
fittingness of blame, in a fundamental sense, depends on 
whether the addressee is capable of uptake of the right kind. If 
she meets the uptake-constraint, she is moral addressee eligible. 
As such, it would be suitable to take an addressee participant 
stance towards her. 
The next step of a moral exchange consists of moral response in 
reaction to moral address, typically expressed via an apology, an 
explanation, or an excuse, etc. I argue that moral response has 
the functional aim of expressing, indicating, or signaling uptake. 
In other words, moral response is the salient or expressive 
aspect of uptake. It communicates that one has recognized the 
addressor’s reaction as moral address. And similar to moral 
address, moral response can take various forms and convey 
various uptake-associated messages. For instance, one can 
express uptake by hanging one’s head and avoiding eye contact, 
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thus communicating uptake in the form of guilt and/or shame. 
Or by starting to explain, excuse or even justify one’s behavior, 
or by begging for forgiveness, or by attempting to compensate 
the addressor with a gift or a favor. 
So, some moral responses, like remorse, express uptake by 
acknowledging the message conveyed by the preceding (or 
anticipated, imagined) moral address. Others, like excuses or 
justifications, also express uptake because they indicate that 
one has recognized the reaction as moral address, despite 
denying or disputing (part of) the content conveyed. Non-
linguistic behaviors, like facial expressions, posture and 
distance, together with paralinguistic features, like tone and 
volume of voice, are significant communicators of uptake. The 
food-stand scenario (section 2.2) shows how such behaviors 
many times are the primary expressions of uptake even for 
typical adult humans.  
The common denominator of all of the types and forms of moral 
response mentioned is that their function is to communicate 
uptake, i.e. the state of recognizing the other party’s reaction as 
moral address (but not necessarily that one agrees with the 
perceived content). Apart from this, and similar to moral 
address, the various action tendencies of moral response 
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convey various contents, and can be attributed further 
particular functions (c.f. Schmader & Lickel, 2006).19 Explicit or 
implicit forms of asking for forgiveness, may for instance have 
further functional aims, such as reconciliation (Roberts, 1995; 
c.f. Hughes & Warmke, 2017). And expressing guilt, even when 
such expression is accompanied by a verbal excuse or 
justification, may have appeasing functions because it “conveys 
a positive message of concern” (Baumeister et al., 1994, p. 
260).20  
Thus, moral response has the common function of 
communicating uptake, and it therefore has its own general 
suitability requirements. The particular fittingness of a specific 
instance of moral response depends on the particular content 
and validity of the preceding moral address (i.e. whether one 
has wronged the other, the type and graveness of the 
transgression, etc.) as well as other factors. The general 
suitability of moral response, however, depends on whether it 
would make sense to respond in such a manner to an entity. 
 
19 For example, see Haidt (2003) for a suggestion about the nature of ”self-
conscious emotions” (like shame, embarassment and guilt), their elicitors, 
and action tendencies. 
20 Expressions of shame or embarrassment have been suggested to reduce 
conflict, and increase cooperation (c.f. Keltner et al., 1997; Keltner & 
Buswell, 1997).  
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Moral response is appropriate, in a fundamental way, only if the 
perceived (actual or prospective) addressor is able (and 
inclined) to recognize moral response in the first place.  
The addressor participant stance, then, is the perspective from 
which we are disposed to morally respond to someone. Moral 
addressors are eligible as such in virtue of being appropriate 
recipients of moral response. Given the functional aim of moral 
response as expressing uptake, there are some forms of moral 
response that, at least, some typically addressee exempted 
entities would recognize as such and which they even seem to 
expect.21  
One can express uptake of Molly’s moral address by, for 
instance, quickly backing away, lowering one’s head, and talking 
to her in a gentle voice. And of course, by respecting her physical 
boundaries in the future. This, as opposed to, e.g., scolding her 
or physically punishing her for being “disobedient”, “unreliable” 
and/or “dangerous”. Similarly, even if a young child is judged 
unfit for many (if not most) forms of moral address, it still seems 
to make sense to morally respond to her moral address. Nour’s 
parent could, for example, try to explain that she didn’t mean to 
rinse the beaters, say that she is sorry she forgot, and, try to offer 
 
21 See footnotes 14 and 15. 
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Nour a fruit instead. This, as opposed to, e.g., sending Nour to 
her room for being “naughty”, ignoring her, or simply laughing 
her off as “silly”. 
I, therefore, argue that young children and dogs, and many other 
entities whose moral agency is disputed or denied, are moral 
addressors and suitable recipients of moral response.  What this 
means, ultimately, is that it makes sense to provide 
explanations, excuses, justifications, reparations, amends, etc. to 
them.22 We, therefore, have reason to take the addressor 
participant stance towards them.  
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that moral address and moral response have 
distinct functional roles. These functions, in turn, give rise to 
distinct eligibility requirements. While a function of moral 
address is to evoke qualified uptake of its content, the aim of 
moral response is to communicate uptake. By consequence, 
there are some examples of entities towards which we seem to 
have reason to adopt a distinct addressor participant stance, 
 
22 And by ”make sense” I am here strictly referring to the communicative 
function and value of other-directed moral response. There may of course 
be other reasons for expressing these kinds of responses. 
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regardless of their eligibility as moral addressees. These beings 
could then meet the condition of the practice-focused approach 
to moral agency of participating in MRPs.  
Needless to say, the case for an addressor participant stance 
raises additional questions in need of further discussion. For 
instance, questions regarding the particular suitability and 
fittingness of moral response, i.e. when and how one should take 
an addressor participant stance, and on what grounds. The 
suggested distinction between addressor and addressee 
eligibility might also highlight further, normative, reasons for re-
assessing our current participatory and exempting practices. If 
large populations of moral addressor participants are habitually 
exempted, “claimant injustice” (Carbonell, 2019) may extend 
well beyond practices involving the exemption of paradigmatic 
moral agents.23 Similarly, recent suggestions about the “agency 
cultivating” (Vargas, 2013, 2018) or “scaffolding” (McGeer, 
2015; McGeer & Pettitt, 2015) potential of MRPs, seem to 
prompt us to investigate possible effects of our exempting 
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